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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
need for compelling them to perform their obligations, it is shock-
ing to think that one might be accused-and much more so, con-
victed-of crime for not supporting a child whose paternity he
might well have questioned. To permit a civil suit to establish
paternity and the duty to support, even for a period prior to the
suit, and to permit criminal prosecution for failure to support
once the obligation had been established would be quite different
things. This is not to say that the legislature cannot provide
otherwise, and unfortunately it has provided otherwise since
these decisions.3
PRESCRIPTION
Joseph Dainow*
AcQuIsITIvE PRESCRIPTION
The case of Ramsey v. Murphy' illustrates the usefulness of
the thirty-year prescription2 in providing stability for land titles
and in making unnecessary a probe concerning the actual validity
of very old transactions (which may very well have been per-
fectly good). Fifty years after the settlement of a succession, the
plaintiffs claimed an interest in property which once belonged
to their grandparents. In the settlement of the original suc-
cession, the property had been sold to pay debts and then it was
repurchased by another grandchild who lived on the property.
The latter fenced it in, paid taxes, sold timber, granted mineral
leases, and mortgaged the property, and then he conveyed it to
another, who continued the physical possession by himself and
through a tenant until the present suit. Without investigating
the plaintiff's charge of invalidity against the succession sale
and repurchase half a century. ago, the court held that by reason
of privity of contract, the present possession could be tacked on
to the preceding one, thereby making over thirty years since the
plaintiff's majority in 1917.3 Cases like this demonstrate force-
36. Act 368 of 1952, amending Criminal Code Article 74 (La. R.S. 14:74).
Under this amendment, there is no provision for the establishment of the
parenthood of the defendant when the civil law establishes a presumption of
legitimate paternity in another person. Thus the result which the state
sought to achieve in State v. Randall, 219 La. 578, 53 So. 2d 689 (1951), men-
tioned in the text above, is not possible under this amendment.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 220 La. 745, 57 So. 2d 670 (1952).
2. Art. 3499 et seq., La. Civil Code of 1870.
3. This also eliminated any need to investigate the effects of the 1920 and
1924 amendments of Civil Code Art. 3478.
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fully one of the fundamental policy considerations for the exis-
tence and continuation of the long term acquisitive prescription.
In Kelso v. Caffery4 the Supreme Court likewise found it
simpler and easier to settle a petitory action on the basis of pre-
scription than to reinvestigate the direct issues of conflicting title
claims on which the trial court had made its original adjudication.
The land in question was low coastal marsh land, and the plain-
tiff challenged the defendant's possession because it was not
enclosed, inhabited, or cultivated. The defendant did have a
"just title" in a deed translative of ownership, and the presumed
good faith, for the ten-year acquisitive prescription. 5 With regard
to his possession, the facts showed that he had had the land
surveyed, maintained visible boundary markers, and that it had
been leased for actual trapping operations for many years. In
view of the variety of the kinds of lands in Louisiana, it would
be impossible to establish cultivation or habitation or any other
exclusive tests for determining the question of possession for
purposes of prescription. Under the circumstances of this case,
the court considered that the defendants had exercised all the
acts of possession which can-customarily be supported by the type
of land involved.6
In Blanchard v. Norman-Breaux Lumber Company one of the
problems concerned the elements necessary for the kind of pos-
session which would support the ten-year acquisitive prescrip-
tion in good faith with just title. The warrantor in the case
asserted ownership of the land in question by reason of its
possession through timber operations, tax payments, boundary
markers, and the granting of mineral and trapping leases. In all
of this, the court found no possession for purposes of prescrip-
tion: the cutting of trees was under a timber deed only, the
markers had been put up for the timber operations, and while
the other elements (taxes, leases) might show an interest to act
as owner, they did not satisfy the physical requirement for the
establishment of a "possession as owner" which is indispensable
for any kind of acquisitive prescription.
The concept of possession-as the indispensable element for
any kind of acquisitive prescription-has always been a source
4. 221 La. 1, 58 So. 2d 402 (1952).
5. Art. 3478 et seq., La. Civil Code of 1870.
6. Cf. Veltin v. Haas, 207 La. 650, 21 So. 2d 862 (1945), where similar prin-
ciple was applied to sustain possession of swamp lands whose only use was
for their timber.
7. 220 La. 633, 57 So. 2d 211 (1952).
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of difficulty in practical application. A similar concept of pos-
session is likewise the basic requirement for the possessory
action.8 In Hill v. Richey9 the court re-examined these two con-
cepts of possession and their relationship. In the process, there
is an excellent refresher discussion of the whole subject, covering
the code provisions and containing the citations of many old as
well as recent appropriate cases together with several good
lengthy quotations. In addition to the criteria of possession neces-
sary to support the possessory action-which the court assimilates
to the possession for the thirty-year acquisitive prescription-
there is also discussion of the problems connected with "enclo-
sures" and "boundaries" and "disturbances." The details are not
for repetition, and the whole should be read in the court's
original.
For the ten-year acquisitive prescription, good faith is a
necessary element. 10 Although there is a presumption in favor of
good faith,"' this can be rebutted by evidence to the contrary.
The weighing of this evidence becomes a factual issue for par-
ticularization in each case; nevertheless, general principles also
emerge from the decisions. In Juneau v. Laborde12 the plaintiffs
claimed an interest as heirs of their mother in certain property
which had belonged to the community of their parents. The defen-
dant asserted acquisition of title by the ten-year prescription
based on his author's purchase from the father who sold the
property after his wife's death, together with possession in good
faith. However, the court found that at the time of this purchase
the defendant and his author both knew the family and the
property history. They knew that the wife had died leaving chil-
dren. In deciding this case, the court made a broad general state-
ment as follows:
"With the information that he [defendant] possessed,
which was certainly sufficient to excite inquiry, a duty de-
volved upon him to investigate the title before purchasing.
If he had made the investigation, actual knowledge of the
outstanding interest would have been acquired. Having
failed in that duty, he is in law chargeable with the knowl-
edge."'13
8. Arts. 47, 49, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
9. 221 La. 402, 59 So. 2d 434 (1952).
10. Art. 3479, La. Civil Code of 1870.
11. Art. 3481, La. Civil Code of 1870.
12. 219 La. 921, 54 So. 2d 325 (1951).
13. 219 La. 921, 932, 54 So. 2d 325, 329.
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While there may be no doubt in the present case, there might
well be situations in which it would not be as easy to say that
information was "sufficient to excite inquiry" thereby imposing
a "duty ... to investigate the title." Furthermore, in such a case,
if the investigation failed to reveal the defect, the purchaser
might be in moral good faith, but he could still be held to lack
legal good faith for prescription, on the grounds that once an
investigation was actually undertaken, there was responsibility
to discover everything that should have been found.' 4 Is the
purchaser to be caught between two fires? Once there is a duty
to investigate beyond the immediate vendor, it would appear
that the purchaser is responsible for the accuracy of the report.
If there is an undiscovered defect, he can look only to the thirty-
year curative prescription because the ten-year one is denied
to him.
LIBERATIVE PRESCRIPTION
One of the fundamental principles of liberative prescription
is that a person will lose the power to exercise a right if he fails
to act within a stated period during which he could have acted.
Thus prescription does not start to run until the obligation is due
and demandable, 15 and in the case of damages only from the dis-
covery of the wrongful act. 16 Similarly, there are suspensions of
the running of time in favor of minors and others while under
legal incapacity to act in the exercise of their rights. An unusual
basis for asserting suspension was made in Ayres v. New York
Life Insurance Company,' where physical incapacity through
illness was urged as a proper situation for the maxim "contra
non volentem agere nulla currit praescriptio" (prescription does
not run against one who lacks the will-legal capacity-to act).
The court dismissed the contention, pointing out that (1) this
maxim does not have general application in Louisiana, (2) when
applicable, it refers to a different kind of fact situation, and (3)
the present situation is not covered within the contemplation of
Article 3521 of the Civil Code.
14. Dinwiddie v. Cox, 9 So. 2d 68 (La. App. 1942); Heirs of Dohan v.
Murdock, 41 La. Ann. 494, 6 So. 131 (1889); Blair v. Dwyer, 110 La. 332, 34 So.
464 (1903).
15. Darby v. Darby, 120 La. 847, 45 So. 747 (1908).
16. Art. 3537, La. Civil Code of 1870; Agnew v. Hopper, 28 So. 2d 375 (La.
App. 1946); Dupuy v. Blotner, 6 So. 2d 560 (La. App. 1942).
17. 219 La. 945, 54 So. 2d 409 (1951).
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